

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 GENEVA 04072

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PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: US PLENARY STATEMENT, MARCH 15

CTB MESSAGE NO. 174

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PLENARY STATEMENT BY AMB. PAUL C.
WARNKE ON MARCH 15, 1978: BEGIN TEXT:

IN DR. MOROKHOV'S PLENARY STATEMENT OF MARCH 3 AND IN
SUBSEQUENT PRESENTATIONS IN THE TECHNICAL SUB-GROUP, THE
SOVIET DELEGATION HAS DESCRIBED VARIOUS CONCERNS REGARDING
THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL ON INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLA-
TIONS AND HAS OUTLINED AN APPROACH OF ITS OWN ON THIS
IMPORTANT VERIFICATION MATTER. TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO
COMMENT ON THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION
AND ON CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE PROPOSED SOVIET APPROACH.
IN DOING SO, I PLAN TO INDICATE WHERE WE FEEL SOVIET
OBJECTIONS TO OUR CONCEPTS ARE UNJUSTIFIED, WHERE WE
BELIEVE THERE IS SOME MERIT TO SOVIET SUGGESTIONS, WHERE
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WE CONSIDER THAT A SUBSTANTIAL COMMONALITY OF VIEWS
ALREADY EXISTS, AND WHERE WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT REMAINING
DIFFERENCES CAN BE NARROWED.

THE FIRST BROAD AREA OF CONCERN MENTIONED BY THE SOVIET
DELEGATION RELATES TO THE BASIC PURPOSE OF INTERNAL SEIS-
MIC INSTALLATIONS--NOT ONLY TO WHAT THOSE INSTALLATIONS

SHOULD DO, BUT ALSO TO WHAT THEY SHOULD NOT DO. IN PARTICULAR, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS ARGUED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS SET ITS SIGHTS TOO HIGH IN TERMS OF THE CONTRIBUTION THAT INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS SHOULD MAKE TO VERIFICATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. AND IT HAS ARGUED THAT, IN DOING SO, WE HAVE GONE BEYOND WHAT IS NECESSARY FOR TREATY VERIFICATION, AND HAVE EVEN PROPOSED MEASURES THAT WOULD ENDANGER THE SECURITY OF THE SOVIET STATE.

IT SHOULD NOT BE NECESSARY TO STATE, AS I HAVE IN THE PAST AND DO NOW, THAT THE UNITED STATES OBJECTIVE IN PURSUING THE INTERNAL STATIONS, AND ITS ONLY OBJECTIVE, IS TO INCREASE CONFIDENCE IN TREATY COMPLIANCE AND TO PROMOTE THE SMOOTH AND COOPERATIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATY. WE ARE ALL AGREED THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS--SEISMIC AND OTHERWISE--WILL PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN FULFILLING THAT OBJECTIVE. BUT MY DELEGATION BELIEVES STRONGLY THAT THE INTERNAL STATIONS SHOULD PLAY AN INTEGRAL ROLE.

WE SHOULD NOT ESTABLISH ARBITRARY LIMITS TO THE CONTRIBUTION THAT THOSE STATIONS CAN MAKE TO OVERALL CONFIDENCE IN TREATY COMPLIANCE. WE WOULD BE FOREGOING AN IMPORTANT MEANS OF INCREASING SUCH CONFIDENCE IF WE WERE TO USE THEM MERELY TO HELP CLARIFY THE CHARACTER OF
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AMBIGUOUS EVENTS RECORDED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. INSTEAD, WE SHOULD ALSO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR ABILITY TO DETECT AND IDENTIFY EVENTS AT LOWER LEVELS THAN COULD BE ACHIEVED TELESEISMICALLY. INTERNAL STATIONS CAN PROVIDE EACH PARTICIPANT ADDITIONAL ASSURANCE THAT THE TREATY IS BEING EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED AT LEVELS AT WHICH TELESEISMIC MEANS CAN MAKE LITTLE OR NO CONTRIBUTION. SEISMIC INFORMATION FROM INTERNAL STATIONS, INCLUDING DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION OF EVENTS THAT MIGHT NOT EVEN BE OBSERVED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS ALONE, WILL PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL BODY OF DATA TO IMPROVE CONFIDENCE IN TREATY COMPLIANCE. INDEED, CONCERNS ABOUT TREATY COMPLIANCE ARE MOST LIKELY TO ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH LOW MAGNITUDE EVENTS. THE INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS WILL REDUCE THIS IMPORTANT AREA OF UNCERTAINTY BY IMPROVING BOTH DETECTION AND IDENTIFICATION AT LOW MAGNITUDES AND WILL THEREFORE REDUCE GROUNDS FOR DOUBT ABOUT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE TREATY REGIME.

FOR THESE REASONS, WE COULD NOT ACCEPT AN APPROACH PERMITTING DATA FROM THE INTERNAL STATIONS TO BE MADE AVAILABLE ONLY UPON REQUEST AND ONLY FOR THE

PURPOSE OF RESOLVING THE NATURE OF EVENTS DETECTED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. REQUIRING A SPECIAL REQUEST TO OBTAIN DATA FROM INTERNAL STATIONS COULD CAUSE A CONTINUING SERIES OF ANNOYANCES AND IRRITATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WOULD BE GOOD REASON TO ASK FOR CLARIFYING DATA FROM INTERNAL STATIONS FREQUENTLY, GIVEN THE REGULAR OCCURRENCE OF SMALL UNIDENTIFIED EVENTS--OR EVEN FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME, IN THE CASE OF EARTHQUAKE AFTERSHOCKS WHICH OFTEN LAST FOR WEEKS. WE SHOULD DO OUR BEST TO

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AVOID ANY POSSIBILITY OF LETTING DATA RETRIEVAL FROM INTERNAL STATIONS BECOME A CONFRONTATIONAL PROCEDURE. INSTEAD, SINCE THESE DATA WILL INCREASE CONFIDENCE IN TREATY COMPLIANCE, IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL PARTICIPANTS THAT ALL OF THE DATA BE PROVIDED ON A SMOOTHLY FUNCTIONING, ROUTINE BASIS.

ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT MY DELEGATION'S APPROACH TO INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS WOULD JEOPARDIZE SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY. ON MARCH 3, FOR EXAMPLE, DR. MOROKHOV STATED THAT, WITH THE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES FOR STATION DESIGN, "IT BECOMES POSSIBLE TO RECORD ANY EVENTS TAKING PLACE ON THE TERRITORY OF A STATE, INCLUDING THOSE EVENTS WHICH HAVE NO

RELATION WHATEVER TO COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY BEING DEVELOPED." IN THE COURSE OF DISCUSSIONS, WE HAVE HEARD REFERENCES TO SUCH ACTIVITIES AS MISSILE LAUNCHES AND THE SECRET

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MOVEMENT OF MILITARY VEHICLES.

THERE IS NO TECHNICAL FOUNDATION FOR THESE CONCERNS. THE SEISMIC INSTRUMENTS THAT WE HAVE PROPOSED FOR INCLUSION IN THE INSTALLATIONS ARE INCAPABLE OF DETECTING ACTIVITIES OF THE TYPE THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS DISCUSSED BEYOND A DISTANCE OF A FEW TENS OF KILOMETERS. THE GENERAL LOCATIONS OF THE INSTALLATIONS WOULD BE FIXED BY AGREEMENT IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS, ENSURING THAT THE SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS WOULD BE LOCATED FAR ENOUGH FROM THESE ACTIVITIES TO AVOID THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR BEING DETECTED. AND THE SITE SELECTION PROCEDURES THAT WE HAVE PROPOSED WILL FURTHER ENABLE THE HOST PARTY TO EMLACE ITS INSTALLATIONS AWAY FROM SUCH ACTIVITIES. MOREOVER, IT WOULD SEEM TO US THAT BOTH THE HOST PARTY AND THE PARTY RECEIVING THE DATA WOULD HAVE STRONG REASONS FOR NOT WANTING MILITARY, OR OTHER ACTIVITIES THAT COULD INTERFERE WITH NORMAL RECORDING AT THE STATIONS, TO TAKE PLACE WITHIN THE VERY SMALL AREAS IN WHICH THOSE ACTIVITIES COULD BE RECORDED. THE HOST PARTY WOULD NOT WANT SEISMIC SIGNALS RESULTING FROM THESE ACTIVITIES TO RAISE DOUBTS ABOUT WHETHER IT WAS INTENTIONALLY MASKING DATA RELEVANT TO ITS COMPLIANCE WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN. AND THE PARTY RECEIVING THE DATA WOULD NOT WANT EXTRANEIOUS SEISMIC NOISE TO INTERFERE WITH THE ABILITY OF THE STATION TO VERIFY THE TREATY.

THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION IS CONVINCED THAT THE USE OF INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS TO PROMOTE CONFIDENCE IN TREATY COMPLIANCE IS IN NO WAY INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE INSTALLATIONS ARE LOCATED. THEREFORE WE CAN AGREE WITH DR. MOROKHDV'S SUGGESTION OF MARCH 3 THAT "THE SITES SHALL USE AGREED EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY FOR PURPOSES OF VERIFYING TREATY COMPLIANCE." WE WOULD WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS FURTHER AND TO LAY TO REST ANY SPECIFIC CONCERNS THAT THE SOVIET DELEGATION MAY CONTINUE TO HAVE IN THIS REGARD.

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ANOTHER CONCERN REFLECTED IN RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS

IS THAT THE UNITED STATES APPROACH GOES LITTLE BEYOND THE OLD IDEA OF "BLACK BOXES" AND INFRINGES UPON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PARTY ON WHOSE TERRITORY THE STATIONS ARE LOCATED. WE CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS ASSESSMENT, OR WITH THE CHARACTERIZATION OF THE INSTALLATIONS WE HAVE PROPOSED AS "SUPRANATIONAL STATIONS".

OF COURSE, GIVEN THE RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS OF THE SYSTEM AND THE NATURE OF THE VERIFICATION TASK, THE EQUIPMENT WE HAVE PROPOSED WOULD OPERATE WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF AUTOMATICITY. BUT THE AUTOMATIC FEATURES, AS WELL AS THE COOPERATIVE PROCEDURES WE HAVE PROPOSED, DO NOT DETRACT FROM THE NATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE INSTALLATIONS, AND I AM CONFIDENT THAT FURTHER CLARIFICATION AND DISCUSSION OF THESE PROPOSALS WILL DEMONSTRATE THAT THE APPROACHES OF OUR THREE DELEGATIONS ARE NOT TOO FAR APART.

FOR EXAMPLE, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ELIMINATE ANY MISUNDERSTANDING THAT MAY EXIST ABOUT PROCEDURES FOR REMOTE OPERATION OF THE STATIONS. UNDER OUR APPROACH, ANY USE OF THE COMMAND CHANNEL WOULD BE MADE ONLY BY THE HOST PARTY. MOREOVER, WE SHOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO CLARIFY THAT OUR PROPOSED PROCEDURES FOR SITE SELECTION AND FOR STATION CHECKOUT AND MAINTENANCE ARE APPROPRIATE TO THE SPECIFIC VERIFICATION TASKS AT HAND, AND DO NOT GIVE VISITING PERSONNEL OPPORTUNITIES TO ENGAGE IN UNAUTHORIZED, UNRELATED ACTIVITIES, TO HAVE ACCESS OUTSIDE OF STRICTLY LIMITED AREAS, OR TO REMAIN IN THOSE AREAS LONGER THAN NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THEIR FUNCTIONS.

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WHILE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS MAY BE REQUIRED IN ORDER TO

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MAKE IT CLEAR THAT ALL ASPECTS OF OUR APPROACH ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH HOST PARTY SOVEREIGNTY AND SECURITY, WE ARE NEVERTHELESS ENCOURAGED THAT, AS REFLECTED IN RECENT SOVIET STATEMENTS, SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING IS DEVELOPING ON SEVERAL KEY FEATURES. IN PARTICULAR, WE WELCOME THE REMARKS OF DR. MOROKHOV, IN PRESENTING THE SOVIET APPROACH TO INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS ON MARCH 3, THAT THERE SHOULD BE AGREED TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STATION EQUIPMENT, AN AGREED DEVICE FOR AUTHENTICATING THE DATA, AGREED PROCEDURES RELATED TO THE INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE AUTHENTICATION DEVICE AND AGREED COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS THAT MEET AGREED TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS.

A THIRD CONCERN RECENTLY EXPRESSED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS BASED ON THE FACT THAT MY DELEGATION HAS NOT YET ADVANCED SPECIFIC PROPOSALS REGARDING THE NUMBER OR LOCATION OF THE INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS. WE UNDER-
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STAND THIS CONCERN AND INTEND TO RESPOND AS SOON AS WE ARE ABLE. AT THE PRESENT TIME MY GOVERNMENT IS ENGAGED IN AN INTENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE REGIONAL COVERAGE THAT COULD BE ACHIEVED BY VARIOUS COMBINATIONS OF SEISMIC STATIONS AND ARRAYS. WHILE WE ARE THEREFORE NOT CURRENTLY IN A POSITION TO PROPOSE A SPECIFIC NUMBER, WE ARE EXAMINING NETWORKS RANGING UP TO AROUND 20 INSTALLATIONS. THE PRECISE NUMBER WILL DEPEND ON SUCH FACTORS AS SITE NOISE LEVELS, LOCATIONS, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH ARRAYS OF SEISMOMETERS MAY BE INCLUDED. THE INCLUSION OF ARRAYS, IN OUR VIEW, COULD REDUCE THE NUMBER OF INSTALLATIONS BELOW THE NUMBER FOR A NETWORK CONSISTING ONLY OF SINGLE STATIONS. WITH RESPECT TO LOCATION, WE BELIEVE THAT THE INSTALLATIONS CAN BE LOCATED IN THE VICINITY OF CURRENTLY EXISTING NATIONAL STATIONS, PROVIDED THAT THERE ARE STATIONS IN THE GENERAL AREAS AGREED IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS

AND THAT THE BOREHOLES CAN BE PLACED AT LOW-NOISE SITES. WE CAN AGREE WITH DR. MOROKHOV'S SUGGESTION THAT ALL OF THE STATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE BILATERAL EXCHANGE CAN BE DESIGNATED FOR PARTICIPATION IN THE GLOBAL NETWORK. AFTER OUR UPCOMING RECESS, WE HOPE TO BE IN A POSITION TO PRESENT MORE DETAILED VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS.

FINALLY, THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE TIME FRAME IN WHICH OUR PROPOSALS MIGHT BE IMPLEMENTED AND ABOUT THE LEVEL OF DETAIL IN WHICH OUR PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN FORMULATED. THE PRINCIPAL BASIS FOR THESE CONCERNS APPEARS TO BE THE FACT THAT THE EQUIPMENT WE HAVE DESCRIBED FOR THE INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS IS CURRENTLY BEING DEVELOPED AND MAY NOT BE READY FOR DEPLOYMENT WHEN THE TREATY ENTERS INTO FORCE. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAS THEREFORE SUGGESTED THAT WE BEGIN VERIFI-
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CATION OF THE TREATY ON THE BASIS OF EXISTING EQUIPMENT AND THAT THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION BE GIVEN BROAD AUTHORITY TO WORK OUT DETAILED IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES BASED ON GENERAL PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT.

THE SOVIET APPROACH, AS WE CURRENTLY UNDERSTAND IT, APPEARS TO HAVE A NUMBER OF REALISTIC AND PRACTICAL FEATURES. IN PARTICULAR, IT WOULD ENABLE US TO START THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNAL SEISMIC NETWORKS SOON AFTER THE TREATY ENTERS INTO FORCE. WE AGREE THAT THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION SHOULD PLAY A ROLE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNAL STATION NETWORKS. HOWEVER, IT WOULD FIRST BE ESSENTIAL TO ACHIEVE EXPLICIT AGREEMENT IN THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT ON KEY VERIFICATION OBJECTIVES FOR THE ADVANCED INTERNAL STATIONS, SUCH AS THE NUMBER AND GENERAL LOCATION OF STATIONS; GENERAL PROCEDURES FOR INSTALLATION, OPERATION, AND MAINTENANCE OF EQUIPMENT; GENERAL QUALITY OF THE EQUIPMENT; AND PROVISIONS TO ENSURE THE TIMELY RECEIPT OF ADEQUATELY AUTHENTICATED DATA. IT WOULD, ACCORDINGLY, BE ESSENTIAL THAT GENERAL PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THESE INTERNAL STATIONS BE AGREED IN ADVANCE IN THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT, AS WELL AS TARGET DATES FOR THEIR INSTALLATION. DETAILS CONCERNING EQUIPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION COULD BE WORKED OUT BY THE JOINT CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, CONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED PERFORMANCE CRITERIA AND OBJECTIVES. WE HAVE PROPOSED APPROPRIATE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS THAT ARE INTENDED TO MEET THESE OBJECTIVES.

WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO EXPLORE WITH OUR NEGOTIATING

PARTNERS POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENTS FOR AN INTERIM PERIOD
BETWEEN ENTRY INTO FORCE AND THE TIME THAT ADVANCED
INTERNAL SEISMIC INSTALLATIONS WOULD BE AVAILABLE. THESE
INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS COULD INCLUDE THE USE OF CURRENTLY
AVAILABLE, BUT ADVANCED STATE-OF-THE-ART, EQUIPMENT--

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SUCH AS THE EQUIPMENT USED IN THE PRESENT GENERATION

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OF SEISMIC RESEARCH OBSERVATORIES, WITH THE AUTHENTICA-
TION WE HAVE PROPOSED. IT WOULD SEEM PARTICULARLY REASON-
ABLE TO DO THIS BECAUSE THESE SROS HAVE ALREADY BEEN
DEPLOYED IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES AND REGIONS THROUGHOUT THE
WORLD. WE THEREFORE HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR RELIABILITY
AND THEY CAN BE INSTALLED EASILY AND QUICKLY.

IN THE US VIEW, THERE COULD BE MERIT IN THIS TYPE OF
PRAGMATIC AND GRADUATED APPROACH PROVIDED IT MET THE
FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVES WE HAVE OUTLINED. END TEXT.

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